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Popular conceptions of nationhood in
old and new European member states:
Partial support for the ethnic-civic
framework
Jan Germen Janmaat
Abstract
One of the most influential theories in the study of nationalism has been
the ethnic-East/civic-West framework developed by Hans Kohn. Using
the 2002 Eurobarometer survey on national identity and building on
earlier survey studies, this article examines whether the Kohn framework
is valid at the level of popular understandings of nationhood. It
scrutinizes the framework both conceptually / do people define
nationhood in civic or ethnic terms? / and regionally / is the East
indeed more ethnic than the West and the West more civic than the East?
It will show that identity markers cluster in a political, a cultural and an
ethnic dimension. Respondents do not see these dimensions as competing
sources of nationhood, however. The article further lends some support
for the regional component of the framework. Lastly, it argues that it is
the intensity of national identifications rather than their qualitative
nature (ethnic-civic) that correlates with xenophobia.
Keywords: Nationalism; civic-ethnic; West-East; national identity; survey data;
attitudes.
The sudden occurrence of (sub-state) nationalist sentiments and
violent ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe after the
collapse of Communism caught many scholars by surprise. In
accounting for these phenomena, they rediscovered the ethnic-civic
framework developed by Hans Kohn in World War II. Essentially this
theory argues that civic nationalism became the dominant ideology in
a few core states in Western Europe and America while ethnic notions
of nationhood prevailed in Eastern Europe and the peripheral areas of
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Western Europe. Although few authors embraced this idea whole-
heartedly, many of them started using the ethnic-civic terminology and
allowed it to influence their writings. From the mid 1990s however a
growing body of literature seriously questioned the validity of the
ethnic-East/civic-West framework both conceptually and empirically.
Recently a number of studies have appeared that explored the extent
to which the ethnic-civic divide is reflected in popular notions of
nationhood. That is, does the population at large define its feeling of
national belonging in ethnic-civic terms or is the ethnic-civic distinc-
tion a purely academic construct, driving academic debates but not
having any impact on the national affiliations of the common man?
Analysing survey data of the 1995 edition of the International Social
Survey Programme [ISSP], these studies, in brief, showed that people’s
conceptions of nationhood indeed clustered in an ascriptive (ethnic)
and a voluntarist (civic) dimension. However, they did not find
pronounced differences between East and West in the relative
importance of ethnic and civic criteria.
This study will critically engage and complement these earlier
studies by examining the survey data of the Eurobarometer 2002
edition on national identity. It will address a number of questions that
these studies omitted or only partially investigated. First, it will
explore whether there are underlying dimensions in people’s minds,
and if so, to what extent these dimensions coincide with the ethnic-
civic dichotomy and relate to those found in the previous studies.
A second question this article addresses is whether civic and ethnic
conceptions of nationhood are mutually exclusive or, on the other
hand, reinforcing one another. That is, do people (instinctively) make
tradeoffs in a sense that a preference for, say, a civic notion of
nationhood is automatically at the expense of an ethnic one, or are
these notions of nationhood non-competitive? In much of the
literature there is an implicit understanding that ethnic and civic
national identities exclude each other. It is assumed that the two
cannot go together because the former is seen as a reflection of liberal
inclusive attitudes and the latter as a manifestation of conservatism
and xenophobia. But is there tension between the two identities at the
level of popular understandings of nationhood?
Third, we will examine whether there is a regional difference in the
degree of endorsement of the various identity markers. Stated more
directly: is the East indeed more ethnic than the West and the West
more civic than the East? As the Eurobarometer survey included
questions that covered all aspects of the ethnic-civic distinction, we can
explore its regional component to the fullest extent.
Fourth and last, this study will investigate the relationship between
identity markers and xenophobia. Is it true that people who
predominantly support ethnic criteria of nationhood display more
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negative attitudes towards immigrants than people who endorse civic
criteria, as many experts believe, or is the qualitative nature of national
identities irrelevant for opinions on ethnic others?
Analyses of the Eurobarometer data will reveal that the identity
markers addressed by the ethnic civic framework cluster in three
distinct dimensions: political , cultural and ethnic . The markers
clustering in these dimensions are found to be correlating positively
with one another, which indicates complementary rather than
mutually excluding notions of nationhood. Consequently, we will
argue that a three-dimensional model is better suited to represent
popular notions of nationhood than a crude ethnic-civic dichotomy or
a continuum with ideal types as poles. In addition, and in contrast to
previous studies, this study will show some support for the regional
breakdown of the ethnic-civic framework. However, doubt is cast on
the stability of this identity pattern. Finally, we will contend that it is
the intensity of national affiliations rather than their qualitative nature
(ethnic-civic) that appears to be related to xenofobia and feelings of
closeness to ethnic others.
First, a brief outline will be given of the ethnic-civic framework and
of the criticism it evoked. The second section discusses the results of
the studies on national identity that used the ISSP survey. Analyses of
the Eurobarometer data are presented in section four. The article
concludes by discussing the patterns found and sketching some
implications for existing theories on national identity.
The ethnic-civic dichotomy and its fate in the 1990s and after
Kohn (1944; 1962; 1994) believed that the idea of the nation first arose
in countries with a strong bourgeoisie and/or traditions of liberalism
and decentralized rule (Great Britain, France, United States, Switzer-
land and The Netherlands). This new idea / labelled civic nationalism
by Kohn / inspired millions by propagating the nation as a political
community of citizens with equal rights and duties. Man was to be
liberated from the social bonds: church, class, serfdom, family, that
had kept him ignorant for centuries. Central to the new ideology was
the notion that every person, irrespective of religious, ethnic or class
background, could freely join the nation as long as (s)he swore
allegiance to a set of political principles and institutions representing
the nation’s values and objectives. A nationalism of a different kind
developed in countries with feudal economies and strong absolutist
rule, Kohn argued. Unmitigated by other pressures or interests in
society, this ethnic nationalism commanded an individual’s absolute
commitment to the nation, an attachment overriding all other
loyalties. It rejected the notion of voluntary association and the
representation of the nation as a modern political community involved
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in and committed to contemporary social issues. Instead it regarded
the nation as an everlasting natural entity that had slowly evolved
from prehistoric times. Membership of the nation was fixed, being
grounded in descent, native language, religion and customs and
folklore. According to Kohn, the ethnic brand of nationalism
prevailed in Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the periphery
of Western Europe (e.g. Ireland and Spain).
The civic-ethnic distinction has inspired many authors. In an echo of
Kohn, Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) identify two types of nations: a
political nation, which individuals can become part of either by birth
or voluntary participation, and an ethnic, collectivistic nation, the
membership of which is ascribed by descent (blood). They associate
the first type with Britain and France and the latter with Germany and
Russia (see also Hagendoorn and Pepels 2000). In similar vein, writing
about the nation-building projects in the Soviet successor states,
Kolstø (2000, p. 2) argues that whereas in the West the nation has
traditionally been understood as a community of citizens held together
by a common territory, common government authority, a ‘rival
concept that sees the nation as a cultural entity . . . has deep roots in
the eastern part of Europe, not least in Russia’. Brubaker (1992) used
Kohn’s framework to account for differences in citizenship and
immigration policies between France and Germany. Other scholars
have been quick to put the label ethnic on the nationalisms that
followed the fall of Communism and the break-up of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (e.g. Ignatieff 1994; Snyder
1993).1
The ethnic-civic dichotomy has also attracted a great deal of
criticism. Still relatively mild in his critique is A.D. Smith (1991). He
agrees with Kohn that Western and Eastern models of nationhood
have different historical roots, but he opposes a crude classification
that assigns nations to mutually exclusive ethnic and civic categories.
Instead he contends that
‘Every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying
degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements
predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular
components that are emphasized’ (Smith 1991, p. 13).
Thus, in Smith’s view, the ethnic-civic framework would correspond
more to an ideal type model resembling a continuum with two poles
than to a typology or classification (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004; see
also Zubrzycki 2001). Every nation would be located somewhere on
this continuum with some occupying a position closer to the civic end
and some closer to the ethnic end.
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Kymlicka (1999), Nieguth (1999) and Nielsen (1999) have been more
disapproving of the ethnic-civic dichotomy. They have argued that the
ethnic category, capturing both inclusive and exclusive concepts,
should be decomposed into a cultural dimension (language and
religion) which is in principle open to outsiders and an ascriptive
one (kinship, ancestry and race) which is not. Moreover, Nielsen
(1999) objects to the term civic nationalism if this is taken to mean
liberalism, democracy and state-territorialism and seen as contrasting
with an intolerant antidemocratic ethnic nationalism. Pointing to the
Latin American countries and their experience with military dictator-
ships, he argues that non-ethnic, territorial nationalisms can be quite
antidemocratic. He therefore concludes: ‘Talk of civic nationalism had
better be dropped from our political vocabulary (ibid . p. 127).
Equally critical is Kuzio (2001, 2002). He contends that both
Western and Eastern nations rest on strong ethnic foundations and
that the former have only become more civic in outlook since the
1960s. Drawing on writings of Kaufmann (2000) and A.D. Smith
(1998), he advances an evolutionary model that relates the propor-
tional mix of civic and ethnic practices in a given state to the age of
that state and to the consolidation of democratic institutions / i.e. the
younger the state and the less opportunity it had to develop a solid
democracy, the more ethnic it still is (Kuzio 2002).
Scho¨pflin (2000) is particularly outspoken on the ethnic-East/civic-
West idea. According to him, ‘the proposition that there is a Good
Western nationalism (civic, democratic, peace-loving etc) and a Bad
Eastern nationalism (nasty, brutish and anything but short)’ represents
a ‘truly lazy’ attitude (ibid . pp. 4,5). Indeed, he may be said to be
taking Kuzio’s argument one step further by arguing that from the
nineteenth century onwards Western states needed ethnicity to create
credible national communities. These communities, he goes on to say,
were necessary for the ever-increasing levels of consent that the state
had to win for its expanding role in society. ‘Without ethnicity’,
Scho¨pflin (2000, p. 6) boldly states, ‘it is difficult to secure democracy’.
Yet, he does contend that ethnic sentiments are currently stronger in
the East than in the West due to the former region’s particular
experience with Communism:
Communism eliminated all possible civic institutions and codes of
conduct, it turned these societies into civic deserts where the micro-
level patterns of behaviour were governed by mistrust and char-
acterized by atomization. It was hardly unexpected, therefore, that
ethno-nationalism should have acquired the saliency that it did;
there was no other identity in the public sphere that could have
played this role (ibid. p. 279).
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Lastly, Zimmer (2003) made an important contribution to the ethnic-
civic debate. He criticizes the ethnic-civic dichotomy for grouping
inclusive/exclusive notions and identity markers in one category (either
ethnic or civic). This, he argues, is misleading since it presupposes that
those who favour a deterministic understanding of nationhood by
definition use ethno-cultural markers and those who endorse an
inclusive vision political markers. In reality, however, the former could
well rely on political markers and the latter on cultural issues,
depending on the issues and political opportunity structure of the
day. He therefore proposes to disengage identity markers - ‘symbolic
resources’ in his terminology - from the ethnic-civic distinction so that
the remaining dichotomy reflects exclusively inclusive/voluntarist vs.
ascriptive/organic notions of nationhood - ‘boundary mechanisms’ in
Zimmer’s terms (ibid . p. 178). He further identified four symbolic
resources (political values/institutions, culture, history and geography)
that political entrepreneurs use to back their inclusive or deterministic
visions of the nation with.
The ISSP survey: No differences between East and West in
understandings of nationhood
Until the end of the 1990s the ethnic-civic debate had been very much
a theoretical exercise dominated by historians and political scientists.
If any empirical data were at all studied these usually involved
statements by politicians, discussions in the media or policy docu-
ments. Little attention was paid to the attitudes and opinions of the
common man, partly because of a lack of data. The 1995 ISSP survey,
however, which focused on national identity and attitudes towards
immigrants,2 made it possible for the first time to examine to what
extent the ethnic-civic framework is reflected in popular notions of
nationhood. To the knowledge of the author so far four studies have
used this source to explore the popular bases of national identity.
Jones and Smith (2001a; 2001b), the authors of two of these studies,
have investigated underlying dimensions in people’s minds. They based
their analysis on the following question in the survey:
Some people say the following things are important for being [e.g.,
truly British, Spanish, Hungarian, etc.]. Others say they are not
important. How important do you think each of the following
is. . ..?’ 1 (very important), 2 (fairly important), 3 (not very important),
or 4 (not important at all).
. To have been born in [respondent’s country].
. To have citizenship in [respondent’s country].
. To have lived in [respondent’s country] for most of one’s life.
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. To respect political institutions and laws of [respondent’s
country].
. To feel [British, Spanish, Hungarian, etc.].
. To be able to speak [the dominant language in respondent’s
country].
. To be a [believer in the dominant religion/denomination of
respondent’s country (e.g., Protestant, Christian, etc.)].
Using a rotated factor analysis they found that the answers to this
question clustered in two distinct dimensions, one capturing the items
born, citizenship, lived and religion and labelled ‘ascriptive/objectivist’
by the authors and another correlating strongly with laws, feel and
language which they labelled ‘subjectivist/-voluntarist’. Surprisingly,
these dimensions cut right across the ethnic-civic dichotomy as
traditionally conceived. The notion of voluntarism, for instance, is
commonly associated with a civic understanding of nationhood but
the voluntarist dimension in Jones and Smith’s study also includes
language, an element that is usually grouped in the ethnic category.
Likewise, the idea of ascription (i.e. of fixed traits) is attributed to the
ethnic model of the nation but Jones and Smith’s ascriptive dimension
also incorporates born, citizenship and lived , political items that are
commonly said to belong to a civic identity. The authors concede,
however, that the items may have been understood differently in the
various national contexts. Thus, whereas place of birth (born) may
have been associated with the state and its territory in countries like
France and the USA which are commonly believed to have strong
traditions of civic nationhood, the same item may have been under-
stood as a substitute for descent in countries with reputedly stronger
ethnic visions of the nation.
In addition, proficiency in the dominant language (language) might
have been understood as an indicator for integration into the larger
(civic) community in migrant nations like Australia and the US, while
it may have been regarded as referring to native language (i.e. an
ascribed characteristic) in countries that have no tradition of
immigration. For these reasons, Smith and Jones decided to omit
any reference to the ethnic-civic distinction in their characterization of
the two aforementioned dimensions. Interestingly, their analysis also
revealed that in most states the ascriptive dimension carried greater
weight than the voluntarist dimension. They therefore conclude: ‘our
findings suggest an unanticipated homogeneity in the ways that
citizens around the world think about national identity’ (Jones and
Smith 2001a, p. 45), despite ‘distinctive discourses and policies on
national identity, associated with specific religious, social, economic
and historical trajectories’ (ibid , p. 58).
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A third study using the ISSP survey focused on national pride,
national sentiment and xenophobia (Hjerm 2003). The question in the
survey on national pride was the following:
How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?
1. The way democracy works. /
2. Its political influence in the world. ½
3. [Country’s] economic achievements. ½ political
4. Its social security system. ½
5. Its fair and equal treatment of ½
all groups in society. /
6. Its scientific and technological
achievements. /
7. Its achievements in sports. ½
8. Its achievements in the arts and ½
literature. ½ cultural
9. [Country’s] armed forces. ½
10. Its history. /
Using factor analysis Hjerm distilled two dimensions from the answers
to this question, one clustering the first five indicators which he
interpreted as ‘political’, and one grouping the last five indicators
which he labelled ‘cultural’. Interestingly, comparing national pride
levels in Eastern and Western Europe, Hjerm found similar levels
on the cultural dimension but differing ones on the political dimen-
sion, with Western countries exhibiting higher values of political
national pride than Eastern states. Although labelling the second
dimension as cultural seems rather far-fetched, clustering as it does
items as diverse as armed forces, history, and achievements in sport,
arts and science, the East-West difference on the more coherent
political dimension is noteworthy as it is in line with the traditional
ethnic-East/civic-West view.
Unlike the aforementioned studies, the fourth study using the ISSP
data source (Shulman 2002) did not investigate whether the items of
the survey clustered in one or more dimensions. Focusing on the same
indicators as Jones and Smith and using an additional question on the
sharing of traditions,3 Shulman assumed beforehand that the indica-
tors born, citizenship, lived, laws and feel reflected a civic under-
standing of nationhood and the items language, religion and traditions
a cultural sense of national identity. He took eight countries from the
survey to represent the West and an equal number to represent the
East. Shulman’s main finding was that there were as many indicators
contesting the civic-West/ethnic-East argument as supporting it.
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In addition, the items that supported the argument showed much
larger differences within each of the regions than between the two
regions. These findings led Shulman (2002, p. 583) to conclude that:
Imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European
nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening
civicness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of
democracy and relatively strong and stable political institutions,
cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well.
The studies of both Jones & Smith and Shulman suggest that there are
no substantial differences between regions in the strength of civic/
voluntaristic or ethnocultural/ascriptive identities. Thus, the East-West
component of the ethnic-civic framework seems to be absent in
popular conceptions of nationhood. Yet, as we have seen, Hjerm’s
findings on national pride do seem to support the East-West divide.
This apparent contradiction makes sense if we take a closer look at the
items clustering on Hjerm’s political dimension. Three of these items
(the way democracy works, economic achievements, social security)
refer to achievements that Western nations can obviously take much
greater pride in than Eastern states simply because the latter have just
begun developing their democracies and recovering from the post-
communist socio-economic crisis.
The Eurobarometer 2002 survey: Non-competitive notions of nationhood
Valuable as the ISSP survey has been in uncovering popular
conceptions of nationhood, it nonetheless had two major drawbacks.
First, as pointed out by Jones & Smith, a number of items, notably
born and language, could have been interpreted differently by the
respondents, which makes it difficult to assign meaning to underlying
dimensions in the data. Second, the survey did not contain the crucial
criterion of genealogical descent, a fact much deplored by Shulman.
Because of this, the ethnic category of the ethnic-civic framework
could not be tested to the fullest extent. Moreover, as descent is
unequivocally an ascriptive characteristic (Zimmer 2003), it could have
greatly bolstered Jones & Smith’s dimensions if it had been included.
The Eurobarometer survey on national identity compensates for the
imperfections of the ISSP survey as it does include the item of descent
(‘common ancestry’ in the survey).4 Moreover, it also contains the item
of ‘common history and common destiny’, a characteristic that is
commonly associated with an ethnic understanding of nationhood.
The survey was held in Great Britain, East and West Germany, Greece,
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Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland and
contained the following question on national identity:
Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of
belonging to a nation. To what extent do you agree with the
following statements?‘‘I feel (NATIONALITY) because I share with
my fellow (NATIONALITY) . . .
1. I do not feel (NATIONALITY)
2. A common culture, customs and traditions
3. A common language
4. Common ancestry
5. A common history and a common destiny
6. A common political and legal system
7. Common rights and duties
8. A common system of social security/welfare
9. A national economy
10. A national army
11. Common borders
12. A feeling of national pride
13. National independence and sovereignty
14. Our national character
15. Our national symbols (the flag, the national anthem, etc.)
Respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with each
of the items on a scale with the values of 1 (strongly agree), 2 (tend to
agree), 3 (tend to disagree), 4 (strongly disagree).
It must be noted that the question on national identity in the
Eurobarometer survey was worded quite differently from the one in
the ISSP survey. Whereas the latter asked respondents to evaluate the
importance of certain personal characteristics for making some one a
true [nationality, e.g. Dutchman], the former asked them to state the
importance of certain characteristics buttressing one’s own sense of
national belonging. The ISSP survey therefore taps much more directly
into the issue of open or closed membership of the nation and
therefore into Jones & Smith’s voluntarist-ascriptive dichotomy (or
Zimmer’s boundary mechanisms) than the Eurobarometer. It could be
argued that because of its specific wording the Eurobarometer relates
almost exclusively to properties underpinning national identity
(political, societal, cultural, historical, state-symbolic, i.e. the symbolic
resources in Zimmer’s terms). In other words, the Eurobarometer data
primarily cover the qualitative nature of national identities rather than
inclusive or excluding notions of nationhood.
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A rotated factor analysis performed on the Eurobarometer data
revealed that the aforementioned items grouped into five dimensions
(see Table 1 which presents data of the ten countries grouped
together5). The first dimension, which is the most powerful in terms
of variance explained, could be labelled ‘patriotic’ as it clusters the
items national pride, independence, national character, symbols, and to
a lesser extent borders. It is more interesting, however, to examine
dimensions two, three and four since the items they cover relate to the
ethnic-civic framework. As we can see, dimension two neatly groups
items referring to the political and social system, which makes it
plausible to interpret this dimension as political. This result corre-
sponds to Hjerm’s findings on national pride and confirms the
contention that there is a distinct political dimension to conceptions
of nationhood. Interestingly, dimensions three (labelled cultural) and
four (labelled ethnic) demonstrate that the items of culture and
language should clearly be seen as a separate category distinct from
the items ancestry and history. This supports the aforementioned
criticism of Kymlicka, Nielsen and Nieguth that the ethnic category as
Table 1. Factor analyses of fourteen national identity items (data from ten
European countries; N/8655)
Item Dimension
1 2 3 4 5
(patriotic) (political) (cultural) (ethnic) (army&borders)
culture 0.278 0.224 0.752 0.312 0.080
language 0.208 0.217 0.822 0.256 0.139
ancestry 0.257 0.187 0.374 0.758 0.182
history 0.297 0.288 0.298 0.762 0.109
legal system 0.256 0.762 0.180 0.303 0.126
rights and duties 0.267 0.823 0.212 0.166 0.084
social security 0.210 0.827 0.151 0.085 0.249
economy 0.254 0.677 0.147 0.135 0.472
army 0.393 0.363 -0.006 0.239 0.705
borders 0.413 0.250 0.326 0.085 0.678
national pride 0.776 0.227 0.189 0.202 0.261
independence 0.766 0.343 0.176 0.122 0.200
national character 0.789 0.266 0.209 0.195 0.164
symbols 0.762 0.167 0.188 0.248 0.228
NB: 1. The first item (‘I do not feel [nationality]’) was excluded from the analysis.
2. Items that show loadings of more than 0.5 are underlined.
3. The percentages of variance explained of the five dimensions were 23.1, 22.0, 13.2,
12.0 and 10.9 respectively. The corresponding eigenvalues were 3.24, 3.08, 1.84, 1.68,
and 1.52.
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traditionally conceived should be split into a cultural and an ethnic
component.
It has to be noted though that the pattern of dimensions for the
group of ten states as a whole does not necessarily correspond to that
of individual states. Not only may the dimensions differ but also
their order of importance. Whereas West Germany for instance
follows more or less the general pattern, Hungary presents a strongly
contrasting picture. Not only do the cultural and ethnic items
cluster in one dimension instead of two, also the order of the
dimensions is reversed with the ethno-cultural dimension capturing
the highest percentage of variance. Yet, if we group the countries into
two regions / Western Europe and Eastern Europe / and carry out the
aforementioned factor analysis by region, then both halves of Europe
display the same pattern of dimensions as the one for all countries
together.6 Western Europe follows the general pattern precisely, both
in the nature of the dimensions and in their importance, Eastern
Europe shows the same dimensions but in a slightly different order of
importance.7 Thus, the dimensions identified in Table 1 have cross-
regional validity.
Interestingly, Table 1 also shows that all items correlate positively
with the five dimensions. This pattern of positive correlations is
even more clearly visible from a table of correlations between pairs of
items (see Appendix 1 which displays items of both the Eurobarometer
and ISSP surveys). The positive correlation between for instance
ancestry and rights (0.44) in the Eurobarometer data means that the
higher the level of agreement expressed with common ancestry as an
identity marker so the stronger the support for common rights and
duties as a resource underpinning one’s identity. The inference we can
draw from this is that people apparently see ancestry and rights, and
all the other items in both the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys, more
as non-competitive complementary concepts than as mutually exclu-
sive identity markers. This finding has important consequences for
theories on the nature of the ethnic-civic framework. It shows that
when applied to popular notions of nationhood this framework
cannot be conceived as a dichotomy. Nor can it be viewed as a
continuum with ideal-typical constructs because a continuum also
implies competing concepts (the more one moves to one end of the
continuum the further one moves away from the other end). If we are
at all to visualize the conceptual nature of popular understandings of
nationhood, it would be more appropriate to picture these under-
standings as a three-dimensional model resembling a cone or a
pyramid (see Figure 1).
The fact that the models of a dichotomy or a continuum are
unsuitable to describe popular notions of nationhood does not mean
that they cannot accurately represent intellectual discourse. Indeed,
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contrary to the population at large, many academics, intellectuals and
politicians do consider ethnic and civic markers to be competing
visions of the nation, the tension between the two visions surfacing
when citizenship and immigration issues are debated in the media.
Partial support for the regional component of the ethnic-civic framework
Now that we have established that the markers associated with the
ethnic-civic framework cluster in three dimensions (political, cultural
and ethnic), we can examine differences between countries and
between regions in importance assigned to these dimensions. Table 2
presents the mean scores for each country and each region (Western
Europe, Eastern Europe) on the three dimensions.8 The lower the
score, the higher the level of agreement expressed with a particular
dimension. Scores higher than 2.5 indicate on average disagreement
with a certain dimension buttressing national identity. The mean
scores on the dimensions were calculated by (1) adding up the
respondent scores of the items clustering in a dimension, (2) dividing
the resultant figure by the number of these items (producing the
respondent dimension scores), and (3) taking the average of the
respondent dimension scores. Appendix 2 shows the average scores on
the individual items for the ten countries and the two regions.
The average scores of Table 2 reveal that respondents express
moderate to high levels of agreement across the board. Not one
country shows on average disagreement with any of the three
dimensions. This high level of consensus means that the differences
between the countries and between the regions are not overly
impressive. Yet, the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01
level and do go in the expected direction: East European countries
consider cultural and ethnic criteria more important markers of
nationhood than the Western countries, the difference between the
regions being the largest on the ethnic dimension.9 Vice versa the
Figure 1. Popular understandings of national identity
important
important
political markers
important
cultural markers
ethnic markers
not important
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political dimension is deemed less relevant by the Eastern countries.
The results are thus clearly in line with the ethnic-East/civic-West
argument.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the variation between countries
within a region is substantial. Thus, Greece, as a West European state,
has the lowest score on the ethnic and cultural dimensions of all
countries, which indicates that it attaches more importance to these
dimensions than the four Central European states. Similarly, Poland’s
average score on the political dimension is much lower than that of the
other East European states and it is the second lowest score of all
countries. Close scrutiny of the data in fact shows that the respondents
of some countries express high levels of agreement with all three
dimensions (e.g. Greece and Poland), whereas the respondents of other
countries are much more reserved across the board (e.g. West
Germany, Italy). This may reflect different attitudes towards social
surveys and participating in them as a respondent. Respondents in
some countries might for instance have felt compelled to provide
positive answers, leading them to state high levels of agreement, while
respondents in other countries may not have felt a similar pressure.
Table 2. Mean scores on dimensions of national identity across ten European
countries and two regions
Cultural Ethnic Political
(cultural /
language)
(ancestry /
history)
(legal system /
rights&duties /
social security /
economy)
West Germany 1.69 1.88 1.90
Greece 1.28 1.26 1.47
Italy 1.64 1.83 1.88
Spain 1.57 1.70 1.68
Great Britain 1.57 1.72 1.78
Austria 1.46 1.81 1.78
East Germany 1.54 1.70 1.88
Czech Republic 1.48 1.65 2.03
Hungary 1.35 1.47 1.92
Poland 1.41 1.42 1.56
East 1.44 1.56 1.84
West 1.53 1.69 1.74
NB: 1. On each dimension the difference between the mean scores of the two regions is
statistically significant at an 0.01 level.
2. The N of each country score ranges from 766 (Great Britain) to 1013 (Hungary).
Approximately 1000 respondents were interviewed in each country. The lower N of
Great Britain is explained by the many British respondents who indicated that they
did not feel British (item one). We excluded these respondents from the analysis.
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In order to control for the propensity to state either high or low
levels of support for all three dimensions, we subtracted the scores on
the political dimension from those on the ethnic and from those on the
cultural dimension (Table 3). The resulting figures indicate the
difference in support between the ethnic and the political dimension
on the one hand, and between the cultural and the political dimension
on the other. The lower the score, the stronger the backing for the
ethnic or the cultural dimension relative to the political dimension. As
we can see, the familiar ethnic-East/civic-West pattern emerges even
more clearly from the data of Table 3. Hungary and the Czech
Republic top the list of both the ethnic-political and cultural-political
columns.10 Moreover, all East European countries are in the top five of
the ranking list of countries in the ethnic-political column with Greece
being the only exception. On the cultural-political column the pattern
is slightly less clear because Poland has a score that is so different from
the other Eastern states. Aggregated to the regional level, the data
show that there are substantial and statistically significant differences
between East and West, with the former attaching much more
importance to the ethnic and cultural dimensions in relation to the
political dimension than the latter.
Yet some important reservations have to be stated. First, Eastern
Europe is represented by just four countries. In the ISSP data set the
variations between the nine East European countries were at least as
large as those between the Western states. Thus we might have
witnessed larger differences within Eastern Europe if the Eurobarom-
eter survey had included more East European countries. Second, it is
Table 3. Differences of mean scores between the ethnic and the political
dimension and between the cultural and the political dimension across ten
European states and two regions
ethnic minus
political
cultural minus
political
Hungary /0.46 Hungary /0.58
Czech Republic /0.38 Czech Republic /0.55
Greece /0.21 East Germany /0.34
East Germany /0.17 Austria /0.32
Poland /0.14 Italy /0.25
Great Britain /0.06 West Germany /0.22
Italy /0.05 Great Britain /0.21
West Germany /0.02 Greece /0.19
Spain 0.01 Poland /0.16
Austria 0.03 Spain /0.12
East /0.29 East /0.41
West /0.05 West /0.22
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surprising to find West Germany and Austria occupying such low
positions on the ranking list of countries on the ethnic-political
column. Austria even has a positive score indicating that its
respondents show slightly stronger support for political markers
than for ethnic markers. This result is not in line with the ethnic-
East/civic-West idea as originally formulated by Kohn as he grouped
the German-speaking countries firmly in the ethnic category. Instead,
the fault line in the Eurobarometer data appears to run along the
former Iron Curtain, the former communist states all expressing
stronger support for the ethnic dimension vis-a`-vis the political
dimension than the traditional capitalist states of the West (Greece
being the only exception). Related to this issue is the comparatively
low level of support by the former communist countries for the
political dimension. This is not so surprising as it might appear at first
glance if one reconsiders the items of which this dimension is
composed. As was the case with Hjerm’s political dimension of
national pride, two of these concern the national economy and the
social security system. Thus, one could again argue that in view of the
modest level of real incomes and social services in former communist
countries in relation to Western countries it is quite logical to find only
lukewarm support for these items in Hungary and the Czech Republic
(see Appendix 2).
This conjecture, in turn, raises a number of interesting questions.
For instance, have West Germany and Austria always shown such high
levels of support for the political dimension in relation to the ethnic
dimension? If so, then Kohn was wrong to assume that an ethnic
conception of nationhood prevailed in the German-speaking countries
at the turn of the century (at least as far as mass attitudes on national
identity are concerned). If not, then Austrians and West-Germans
must have moved away from a mainly ethnic to a predominantly
political view of the nation, a shift that might well be related to the
post-war success of these countries in developing a strong economy, a
generous welfare system and a stable democracy. If it can be proved
that such a process has indeed occurred, then might we not expect the
same identity change to happen in the former communist states as they
develop their economies and democracies?
Ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation: Do they at all matter?
The reason why the ethnic-civic framework continues to receive so
much scholarly attention is the assumption by many academics and
policy-makers that civic conceptions of nationhood promote inter-
ethnic tolerance and a positive attitude towards immigrants. By
contrast, ethnic definitions of the nation are seen as contributing to
xenophobia and racism. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey did
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not contain questions on attitudes towards immigrants. Yet it did ask
respondents to state how close they felt towards Jews, Gypsies and
various other nationalities. This question was worded as follows: ‘I
would like you to tell me how close you feel to the following groups of
people’. Respondents could state their answer on a four-point scale
ranging from 1 (very close) to 4 (not at all close). If the aforementioned
assumption were true, one would expect the ethnic and, to a lesser
extent, the cultural dimensions to display a negative correlation and
the political dimension a positive correlation with feelings of closeness
towards Jews and Gypsies (i.e. the stronger the support for the ethnic
and cultural dimensions, the weaker the feelings of closeness; the
stronger the support for the political dimension, the stronger the
feelings of closeness).
As we can see in Table 4, this expectation is not at all borne out by
the data. All three dimensions show only very weak correlations
with feelings of closeness, both in the West and in the East (6
correlations are not even statistically significant at the 0.05 level).
Surprisingly, and totally contrary to the expected relationship, the
ethnic dimension correlates positively with feelings of closeness
towards Gypsies in both the regions. Another unexpected outcome
is that ethnicity correlates negatively with feelings of closeness towards
Jews in the West but positively with these feelings in the East. This
would certainly come as a surprise to those who believe that ethnic
sentiments and anti-Semitism are closely related phenomena especially
in Eastern Europe.
As the ISSP survey does include questions on attitudes towards
immigrants, we can examine whether the pattern of non-correlations
from the Eurobarometer also surfaces in the data of that survey. In
fact, Hjerm (2003) has already used the ISSP survey to correlate
attitudes on immigrants to national pride and national sentiment. The
question on immigrants was phrased as follows:
Table 4. Pearson correlations between feelings of closeness towards ethnic
others and dimensions of nationhood in two regions
West East
feeling close
to Jews
feeling close
to Gypsies
feeling close
to Jews
feeling close
to Gypsies
cultural /0.02 /0.00 0.05** 0.01
ethnic /0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02
political /0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.06**
*statistically significant at an 0.05 level
**statistically significant at an 0.01 level
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There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries
living in [country]. (By ‘‘immigrants’’ we mean people who came to
settle in [country]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements?
1. Immigrants increase crime rates.
2. Immigrants are generally good for [country’s] economy.
3. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in
[country].
4. Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and
cultures.
Hjerm constructed an index of what he called ‘xenophobia’ from the
answers to this question by combining the values on the four
statements (these values ranged from 1-‘agree strongly’ to 5-‘disagree
strongly’ on a five-point scale; the values of statements 1 and 3 were
reversed to ensure that they go in the same direction). He found East
European states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia) to exhibit higher xenophobia levels than West European
states (Austria, Britain, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands). However,
correlations with the political and cultural dimensions of national
pride were weak in both regions, with many countries not showing
statistically significant results (ibid , pp. 420, 421). Although the
correlations with the political dimension did go in the expected
direction (negative / indicating that the more importance assigned
to political items of national pride the lower the level of xenophobia),
the correlations with the cultural dimension were negative in two of
the East European states (not in line with expectation) and positive in
four of the five West European states. The first result is in concordance
with our finding that correlations between the three dimensions of
nationhood and feelings of closeness to Jews and Gypsies are
negligible. The last result moreover matches our observation that the
correlations between ethnicity and feelings of closeness towards Jews
show contrasting directions in Eastern and Western Europe.
Remarkably, Hjerm did find a relation between xenophobia and
national sentiment , a composite variable he constructed from items
referring to feelings of national superiority, unconditional support for
one’s country and pride in national achievements.11 Having first
established that differences between Eastern and Western countries in
the levels of national sentiment are small, he then shows that national
sentiment is positively correlated to xenophobia in both regions (i.e.
the stronger one’s national sentiment the higher one’s level of
xenophobia). However, the correlations between national sentiment
and xenophobia are much stronger in West European states than in
East European countries (ibid. pp. 424, 425). These results suggest two
important conclusions: (1) it is not so much the kind of national
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identity (ethnic, cultural, political) that matters for perceptions on
immigrants and foreigners, but the strength of national identities and
sentiments; (2) Given its stronger connection to xenophobia, national
sentiment is a more dangerous phenomenon in Western Europe than
in the Eastern half of this continent.
Surprisingly, neither Hjerm nor the other authors who used the
ISSP data set correlated attitudes on immigrants to conceptions of
nationhood. Combining several databases and making use of multi-
level analysis, Jones and Smith (2001b) did relate the voluntarist and
ascriptive dimensions of national identity to various demographic
characteristics and to macro-social properties such as a state’s degree
of globalization, its degree of post-industrialism, its degree of internal
cultural differentiation and its militarism. They found that all other
things being equal the higher a country’s degree of post-industrialism,
the stronger the support of its population for the voluntaristic
dimension. However, they also found strong individual effects, with
immigrants, the higher educated and the well-to-do placing more
importance on the voluntaristic type than the native-born, the lower
educated and people with modest incomes.
To rectify the aforementioned omission, we used the ISSP database
to correlate Jones & Smith’s voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions to
the composite construct of xenophobia.12 Obviously, the expectation is
that the voluntarist dimension and xenophobia are negatively corre-
lated / i.e. respondents who exhibit high scores on this dimension
should have lower levels of xenophobia than those with low scores.
Conversely, those who express strong support for the ascriptive
dimension should have higher levels of xenophobia than those
expressing more moderate support. The data of Table 5 produce yet
another surprise. The positive correlations between the ascriptive
dimension and xenophobia in both Eastern and Western Europe are
still in accordance with the expectation, although it is perhaps
remarkable to find Western Europe exhibiting the stronger associa-
tion.13 However, what is truly astonishing is that the voluntarist
Table 5. Pearson correlations between xenophobia anddimensions of nation-
hood in two regions
West East
xenophobia xenophobia
voluntaristic 0.19** 0.18**
ascriptive 0.33** 0.21**
**statistically significant at an 0.01 level
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dimension is also positively related to xenophobia in both regions,
albeit to a slightly weaker extent than the ascriptive dimension. This
means that the stronger a respondent’s support for voluntaristic,
inclusive notions of nationhood, the higher that person’s level of
xenophobia. Surely this result must come as an unpleasant surprise to
those who think that strong inclusive national identities are conducive
to more positive opinions on immigrants and foreigners. Taken
together these results provide further evidence for the notion that
attitudes to immigrants and (in)tolerance of other cultures are not so
much dependent on the qualitative nature of national identities but
more on the intensity of these identities.
Discussion and conclusions
This study has examined to what extent the ethnic-civic framework
surfaces in popular conceptions of nationhood. Using the 2002
Eurobarometer survey on national identity it has produced a number
of interesting results that complement and partially support the
findings of studies that utilized the 1995 ISSP survey on national
identity.
First of all, we found that the identity markers covered by the
ethnic-civic framework clustered in three dimensions: ethnic, cultural
and political. The identification of a separate cultural factor, distinct
from the ethnic dimension, is an important new finding. The studies
based on the ISSP data set could not explore the degree of
interrelatedness of cultural and ethnic factors because the ISSP survey
lacked questions on ethnic markers. As noted before, the existence of a
separate cultural dimension confirms the contention of some critics of
the ethnic-civic framework that cultural markers of nationhood should
not be grouped in the ethnic category because of their inclusive nature.
Another point of interest concerns the boundaries between identity
markers. Whereas our findings conform to the commonly held opinion
that there are distinct political, ethnic and cultural dimensions to
national identifications, Jones & Smith’s voluntarist and ascriptive
constructs based on the ISSP data cut right across these traditionally
conceived dimensions, the former clustering respect for law, learn the
dominant language and self identification and the latter combining
born, citizenship, length of residence and dominant religion . These
contrasting results seem to support Zimmer’s contention that the
ethnic-civic framework should be disaggregated into two different
modes of interpreting national identity: one relating to boundary
mechanisms and another to symbolic resources. Jones & Smith’s
dimensions seem to confirm the existence of boundary mechanisms,
while the present study taps into symbolic resources. Zubrzycki’s
(2001) study on the debate about the meaning of Polishness in the
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media prior to the adoption of the Polish Constitution in April 1997
lends further support for Zimmer’s theory. The liberal intelligentsia
engaging in this debate turned to events in the past (i.e. a symbolic
resource) to support their argument that Poland had a long tradition
of inclusive civic nationhood (i.e. a boundary mechanism).
In fact, our study of the Eurobarometer data revealed that there
are also resources other than political, cultural and ethnic that shaped
national allegiances. Four of these clustered in a dimension that
we labelled patriotism (which proved to be the strongest predictor
of national identity) and two remaining items / army and common
borders / in a construct that could be interpreted as state terri-
tory. Thus, the markers of national identity are many and varied, and
can differ from country to country in kind, importance and inter-
relatedness.
What they all have in common, however, is their non-competitive
nature: not a single pair of markers shows a negative correlation in
either the ISSP or the Eurobarometer database. This is a cardinal
finding. As noted before, many authors assume ethnic and political
visions of the nation or voluntarist and ascriptive boundary mechan-
isms to be mutually excluding concepts. Remember that Zimmer
(2003) argued that the latter could be conceived as a dichotomy. Yet,
valid as this interpretation might be for debates among academics,
intellectuals and politicians, it evidently does not apply to popular
notions of nationhood. Thus, there may be a distinct difference
between the elite and the masses in the way they interpret their
national attachments. The author of the aforementioned study on the
Polish constitutional debate also seems to arrive at this conclusion
when she notes that voter turn-out at the referendum on the
Constitution was very low, ‘which seems to indicate that the debates
that fascinated the elites did not resonate as strongly below’
(Zubrzycki 2001, p. 653). Non-competitive notions of nationhood
are in fact not strictly confined to the common man. Zimmer (2003, p.
188) himself observes that, in response to the perceived threat from
Germany in the late 1930s, Swiss liberals and conservatives united
behind the notion of a distinct Swiss cultural Wesensgemeinschaft ,
which effectively ‘blurred the boundary between voluntarist and
organic conceptions of nationhood’. This suggests that the degree in
which political entrepreneurs disseminate these conceptions as con-
trasting visions of nationhood depends very much on the wider
political and social circumstances and on the opportunities these
circumstances offer them. To come back to the issue of elite-mass
differences, it must be noted that these differences extend to other
areas of public opinion as well. Campbell et al . (1960), for instance,
observed that the left-right dimension in politics does not by far
influence the American electorate to the same extent as it does
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academics, intellectuals and political professionals. This led them to
conclude that ‘the closer the individual stands to the sophisticated
observer in education and political involvement, the more likely it is
that the observer’s analytical constructs will bear fruit’ (ibid. p. 214). It
is doubtful whether scholars of nationalism realize that their models
are likely to suffer from the same deficiency.
The results of our analyses also revealed quite strong support for the
East-West component of the ethnic-civic framework. On average East
European respondents accorded more weight to the cultural and,
especially, the ethnic dimension and less weight to the political
dimension than the respondents from Western Europe. This finding
appears to somewhat contradict those of Shulman and Jones & Smith.
They found either small or no differences at all between the regions,
and on some markers the differences were in the opposite direction
from that expected / i.e. the East assigning more importance to some
‘civic’ markers than the West (see Shulman 2002, pp. 567, 569).
Remember, however, that the ISSP data on which these authors based
their analyses did not contain questions on ethnic markers and that the
difference between East and West was most pronounced on the ethnic
dimension in the Eurobarometer data. In addition, it must be noted
that Shulman’s civic and cultural categories did not coincide with
Jones and Smith’s voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions. Thus, some
items that Shulman considered civic were interpreted as ascriptive by
Jones and Smith. Finally, taking a close look at language and political
institutions, identity markers that were included in both data sets, it
can be noted that the ISSP and the Eurobarometer showed a similar
pattern: Eastern Europe places greater value on language but less
value on political institutions than does Western Europe (see
Appendix 2 and Shulman 2002, pp. 568, 571). Thus the data of the
two surveys are consistent.
Obviously, having established the existence of an ethnic-East/
political-West pattern in a given year says nothing about its stability.
The question to explore is thus to what extent this pattern of identities
is inert, as primordialists would predict, or subject to change, as
instrumentalists would argue. As the 2001 Eurobarometer was a cross-
sectional survey carried out at a single point in time, it does not give us
direct indicators of changes in understandings of nationhood. How-
ever, indirectly the data suggest that these understandings are dynamic
rather than inert. We noted before that compared to the other
countries in the survey respondents in Austria and West Germany
expressed strong support for the political dimension relative to the
ethnic dimension. This is surprising as West Germany and Austria
have traditionally been seen as countries where ethnic conceptions of
nationhood prevail. We postulated that ethnic conceptions might
indeed have been dominant in Austria and West Germany but that the
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success of their post-war democracies and socio-economic systems
may have caused a change in the relative importance of identity
markers. The post-war political and economic achievements are likely
to have increased trust in and therefore identification with public and
political institutions among broad sections of the population. We
further suggested that the same change might happen in East
European countries, provided they succeed in developing stable
democracies and prosperous economies. If such a change happened
in the East, differences between East and West in the qualitative nature
of national identifications might disappear altogether.
A change denoting an increased importance of political markers
would strongly support the argument developed by Kuzio that states
become more civic in outlook as they grow older and develop stable
democracies. On close inspection, one could argue that his argument is
in fact quite compatible with Kohn’s ethnic-civic model, although
Kuzio would probably strongly deny this himself. Kuzio’s model does
not rule out the possibility that at some stage in the past ethnic
sentiments were stronger among Eastern than Western nations. To the
knowledge of the author Kohn never asked himself what would
happen to national identifications in a given nation after that nation
had come to define itself ethnically. As Kohn was a historian who
argued that civic nationalism was a new ideology that arose from the
middle classes at the end of the eighteenth century, it is hard to
imagine his contending that ethnic identities once established would be
cast in concrete and thus be resistant to change. If Kohn were in a
position to agree with the argument that ethnic national identities can
gradually adopt more civic/political features within the framework of
an independent democratic state, then the opinions of both scholars
would not differ.
This study has to end with a sobering note. Despite the ongoing
academic debate on the ethnic-civic framework and the widely shared
concern that ethnic nationalism fuels xenophobia and racism, we have
not found the type of national affiliations to really matter for attitudes
on immigrants and feelings of closeness to Jews and Gypsies.
Remarkably, this applied to both symbolic resources (ethnic, cultural
and political markers) and boundary mechanisms (voluntary vs
ascriptive notions of nationhood). In other words, for their opinions
on immigrants and other nationalities, it was irrelevant whether
respondents cast their national identities in ethnic or political terms,
in an inclusive or excluding manner. What did matter was the level of
importance assigned to the identity markers, i.e. the intensity of
national identifications. The higher this level, the more negative the
perceptions on immigrants. Thus it is not the kind of national identity
but its strength that makes the difference. In line with this argument, it
is imaginable that people with more tolerant views on immigrants have
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more mixed feelings about national identity in general, predisposing
them to give only half-hearted support to all markers associated with
nationhood. In other words, national identity and nationalism may be
considered improper and unfortunate phenomena altogether by this
group of people.
One final reservation has to be stated that might provide some
solace to those convinced of the connection between ethnic/ascribed
identifications and xenophobia. Respondents of both surveys were
most likely not aware of the consequences of each identity marker for
membership of the nation when they filled out the questionnaire. Had
they been informed beforehand of the implications of each item for
accessibility to the nation and of the classifications and judgements
that invisible academics analysing their responses would make after-
wards, they might have shown a different pattern of responses.
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Notes
1. For an extensive overview of scholars that were influenced by the ethnic-civic idea and
of scholars critical of the distinction, see Kuzio (2002) and Shulman (2002).
2. These countries are Ireland, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, The Netherlands, USA,
Canada, Austria, Norway, Australia, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Latvia, Japan, Sweden,
Russia, Slovenia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Philippines, Spain, Germany (West and East
separately) and Bulgaria.
3. This question was worded as follows: ‘Now we would like to ask you a few questions
about minorities in [respondent’s country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the
following statement: it is impossible for people who do not share the customs and traditions
[of respondent’s country] to become fully [e.g. British, German, Hungarian, etc]?’ The
question had a 5-point agree/disagree scale (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree,
disagree, disagree strongly ).
4. Between 27 April 2002 and 10 June 2002, the European Opinion Research Group
carried out wave 57.2 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the European
Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls. The data of
this survey can be ordered at the Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung of the
Universitaet zu Koeln , Germany.
5. As they constitute separate categories in the survey I hold East and West Germany to
be separate countries.
6. I considered Great Britain, West Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Greece to
represent Western Europe, and East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to
belong to Eastern Europe. Some observers would include Greece in the East European
group, pointing to the long period of Ottoman imperial rule and the lack of civic traditions
and institutions in the country. We chose to include it in Western Europe because of its post-
war (interrupted) development as a democratic state with a market economy, its early
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membership of NATO and its inclusion in the EU in the 1981. We concede, however, that this
issue is open to debate.
7. The output of the factor analyses of Germany, Hungary and Western and Eastern
Europe can be obtained from the author.
8. In calculating the scores for Western and Eastern Europe I followed the method
employed by Shulman (2002): all the respondents were first pooled for each region and then
their scores were averaged. The advantage of this approach is that it enables statistical
significance tests of differences between the regions. The disadvantage of some countries
being overrepresented and others underrepresented because of differing sample sizes, which
was a major concern of Shulman, does not apply for the Eurobarometer data because all
countries have approximately equal sample sizes.
9. To assess the statistical significance of differences in the regions’ mean scores an
independent samples t-test was performed on the data.
10. This particular result actually matches the ISSP data set because Hungary and the
Czech Republic headed the ranking list of countries on importance assigned to language in
that data set as well (remember that language is one of the items constituting the cultural
dimension). Moreover, in the same data set respondents in both countries expressed weak
support for the item ‘respect political institutions and law’ (Shulman 2002). This is also
consistent with their score on the political items in the Eurobarometer survey.
11. The question covering national sentiment was phrased as follows: ‘‘How much do you
agree or disagree with the following statements?’’ (‘agree strongly’ / ‘disagree strongly’ on 5-
point scale)
/ I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world.
/ The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like those of
[country]
/ Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries
/ People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong
/ When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [nationality]
12. We calculated the voluntarist dimension, the ascriptive dimension and the index of
xenophobia in the same way as the dimensions of nationhood in the Eurobarometer data set,
i.e. we added up the respondent scores on the items clustering in a dimension and divided the
resulting figure by the number of items pooled in that dimension.
13. Western Europe includes West Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, The
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Spain. Eastern Europe is represented by East Germany,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia and Slovak Republic.
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Appendix 1. Pearson correlations between national identity indicators
Eurobarometer survey
cult lang anc hist leg r&d ss econ arm bor np ind nc sym
culture - .66 .62 .60 .46 .45 .40 .42 .36 .44 .47 .46 .49 .47
language - .62 .57 .46 .44 .39 .41 .36 .44 .44 .42 .46 .46
ancestry - .72 .48 .44 .40 .44 .43 .45 .51 .47 .51 .50
history - .57 .50 .43 .46 .43 .48 .52 .50 .53 .51
legal system - .74 .67 .65 .54 .50 .49 .52 .50 .46
rights and duties - .73 .65 .51 .50 .48 .52 .49 .44
social security - .74 .55 .50 .45 .52 .47 .41
economy - .65 .57 .51 .57 .53 .48
army - .62 .59 .59 .57 .58
borders - .62 .60 .58 .56
national pride - .73 .71 .70
independence - .72 .66
national character - .70
symbols -
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Appendix 1 (Continued )
ISSP survey
born citizenship lived law feel language religion traditions
born - .50 .57 .10 .26 .26 .41 .27
citizenship - .44 .28 .33 .36 .28 .18
lived - .16 .36 .37 .38 .25
Law - .28 .28 .16 .10
feel - .30 .22 .16
language - .21 .22
religion - .19
traditions -
NB: 1. The N for each correlation ranged from 9210 to 9630 in the Eurobarometer survey and from 28107 to 29870 in the ISSP survey.
2. All the correlations in the two tables are statistically significant at an 0.01 level.
3. ISSP data: we added the separate question on traditions (see note 3) to the other seven items on national identity.
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Appendix 2. Mean scores on items of national identity across ten European countries and two regions
culture language ancestry history legal
system
rights &
duties
social
security
economy
West Germany 1.79 1.59 1.88 1.89 1.89 1.82 1.92 2.01
Greece 1.30 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.43 1.43 1.56 1.51
Italy 1.71 1.57 1.75 1.92 1.95 1.78 1.91 1.89
Spain 1.61 1.53 1.69 1.71 1.74 1.63 1.67 1.73
Great Britain 1.67 1.46 1.71 1.74 1.80 1.73 1.82 1.82
Austria 1.51 1.41 1.88 1.75 1.78 1.69 1.74 1.92
East Germany 1.61 1.47 1.70 1.71 1.92 1.83 1.88 1.95
Czech Republic 1.54 1.43 1.62 1.68 2.05 1.95 2.10 2.05
Hungary 1.39 1.31 1.48 1.46 1.84 1.84 2.08 1.96
Poland 1.46 1.35 1.42 1.42 1.53 1.56 1.60 1.57
East 1.50 1.39 1.55 1.57 1.83 1.80 1.92 1.88
West 1.60 1.47 1.69 1.71 1.76 1.68 1.77 1.81
NB: The N of each country score ranges from 793 to 1016.
7
8
Ja
n
G
erm
en
Ja
n
m
a
a
t
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
V
r
i
j
e
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
e
i
t
 
A
m
s
t
e
r
d
a
m
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
0
:
3
9
 
2
7
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
1
